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ABSTRACT
With the advent of the Internet, trading in electronic mar-
ket places has become common practice for an increasing
number of businesses and individuals. The Trading Agent
Competition (TAC) is an open-invitation forum designed
to encourage research into electronic markets and trading
agents. The emphasis of TAC-02 and previous competitions
has been on developing a successful strategy for maximizing
pro…t in a constrained environment. In this paper we dis-
cuss the challenges of TAC which features a complex bench-
mark e-market problem and we present the strategy of the
trading agent Thalis that participated in the competition
successfully obtaining the third place among the …nalists.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Arti…cial Intelligence]: Distributed Arti…cial In-
telligence—Intelligent agents
Keywords
trading agents, auctions, e-commerce
1. INTRODUCTION
Agent-based and multi-agent systems have become in-
creasingly popular as a means of conceptualising and im-
plementing a wide range of applications. More recently,
with the advent of the Internet trading in electronic market
places has become common practice for an increasing num-
ber of businesses and individuals and as a result there has
been a mounting interest regarding the utilisation of agents
in such applications. Agent technology, being particularly
suited for information rich environments, can be applied in
most of the stages involved in searching and buying prod-
ucts and services [7]. For instance, semi-autonomous and
personalised software agents can be used in the negotiation
stage in order to automate the trading process. This has
several potential bene…ts such as reduced costs and greater
e¢ciency as well as savings in time and e¤ort. One of the
most e¢cient ways of negotiating for goods and services is
via auctions. Although constructing an agent to take part
in an auction for a single good is relatively simple, devel-
oping an agent to participate in simultaneous auctions of-
fering complementary and substitutable goods is a complex
task. This is the form of the problem tackled by the Trading
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Agent Competition (TAC) which features arti…cial trading
agents competing against each other in a market-based sce-
nario [3, 4]. In this paper we discuss the challenges of TAC
which features a complex benchmark e-market problem and
we present the strategy of the trading agent Thalis that par-
ticipated successfully in the competition achieving the third
place among the eight …nalist agents. The structure of the
paper is as follows. In the next section an overview of the
game is provided. Next we discuss the challenges that the
competition presents. The rest of the paper is devoted in
the analysis of the bidding strategy of Thalis. The paper
ends with the conclusions.
2. GAME DESCRIPTION
The Trading Agent Competition is an open-invitation fo-
rum designed to encourage research into electronic markets
and trading agents. The emphasis of TAC-02 and previous
competitions has been on developing a successful strategy
for maximizing pro…t in a constrained environment [3, 5].
TAC-02 was organised by the Swedish Institute for Com-
puter Science (SICS). Taking over from the University of
Michigan [9], developers from SICS had to build a new TAC
server for running the competition in accordance with the
TAC game speci…cation. 19 out of the 26 teams originally
expressing interest participated in the event . TAC-02 was
organised into two stages: the …rst stage included the qual-
ifying and seeding round games and the second stage the
semi-…nal and …nal games as well as the workshop that was
held in Edmonton Canada during the AAAI-02 Conference.
TAC trading agents operate within a travel agent sce-
nario buying and selling commodities in order to satisfy their
clients’ preferences. All commodities are traded simultane-
ously in electronic auctions which are operated by the TAC
server. A TAC game lasts 12 minutes and involves eight
agents competing against each other. The agent’s objec-
tive is to create travel packages from TACtown to Tampa
during a notional 5-day period for eight clients. A feasible
travel package for a client requires an in-‡ight reservation
as well as an out-‡ight one and a hotel reservation for the
duration of the trip in the same hotel. In addition, an en-
tertainment package may be assembled comprising of tickets
to one or more of three available entertainment events: alli-
gator wrestling, amusement park and museum. Each of the
agent’s clients has its own individual preferences over the
various aspects of the trip which are provided to the agent
in the beginning of every game. The preferences comprise:
² Arrival and departure days (i.e. arrival on day 1 and
departure on day 3)
² Good Hotel Premium (GHP): A measure of the prefer-
ence for a good hotel over a bad hotel (i.e. an additional
cost the client is willing to pay for good hotel)
² Entertainment Ticket Premiums (ETP): A measure of
the preference for every type of entertainment (i.e. an ad-
ditional cost the client is willing to pay for each type of
entertainment)
Moreover, each travel agent receives an endowment of 12
entertainment tickets which are divided as follows:
² Four tickets of a particular type on day 1 or day 4.
² Four tickets of a particular type on day 2 or day 3.
² Two tickets of a particular type (di¤erent from above)
on day 1 or day 4.
² Two tickets of a particular type (di¤erent from above)
on day 2 or day 3.
There are two types of airline tickets, ‡ights to Tampa (in-
‡ights) and ‡ights from Tampa (out-‡ights). There are four
auctions for the in-‡ight tickets (days 1-4) and four for the
out-‡ight tickets (days 2-5). Flight auctions are single seller,
continuous auctions which open as soon as the game begins
and close at the end of the game. They clear continuously
and prices are set according to a stochastic function with
the opening price being between 250 and 400 cost units.
After the …rst clearing the auction price changes every 24
to 32 seconds and is kept within the range of 150 to 800
cost units. The supply of available seats on these ‡ights
is unlimited. Agents may submit buy bids, but not sell
bids. Price quotes are issued immediately in response to
new bids specifying the ask price, which is simply the price
of the current sell bid. Any buy bids that are matched (i.e.
their prices are equal or higher than the current ask price)
are transacted immediately at the ask price while all others
remain as standing bids until matched or withdrawn.
There are two hotels available: the “good hotel” Tampa
Towers (TT ) and the “not so good” Shoreline Shanties (SS ).
Sixteen (16) rooms of each category of hotel are available for
days 1-4. Hotel auctions are English type, ascending multi-
unit auctions which start at the beginning of the game. Ev-
ery hotel auction clears and matches active bids only once:
at its closing time. Four minutes after the start of the game
one random hotel auction clears and closes. One random
hotel auction closes every minute thereafter. Price quotes
are generated once per minute so as to reveal the current ask
and bid prices and the amount of hotel nights won so far by
every agent. When an auction clears the 16 highest bidders
win the rooms at the 16-th highest price. Bid withdrawal
and reservation resale are not allowed.
Entertainment tickets are traded in continuous double
auctions that start when the game begins and close when
the game ends. Tickets are available from days 1 to 4, and
they are traded in twelve auctions in total. Agents can act
as both buyers and sellers in these auctions and the ask/bid
prices are based only on their bid levels.
The satisfaction of each client is measured by means of a
utility function, whose value expresses the proximity of the
travel package assembled, against the preferences. The top
scoring agent is the one that achieves the highest sum of the
individual client utilities while minimizing the expenses for
the goods bought. The client utility, measured in dollars,
for a feasible travel package is computed by the formula:
CU = 1000¡TravelPenalty+HotelBonus+FunBonus(1)
where
TravelPenalty = 100¤(jAA¡PAj+ jAD¡PDj)1 (2)
HotelBonus = GHP ¤ QH(QH=1 i¤ hotel=TT, 0 other-
wise) (3)
FunBonus = EV 1+EV 2+EV 3 (4)
If the travel package is not feasible the client is assigned
zero utility. At the end of a game the TAC server attempts
to construct an optimal or a near-optimal allocation of the
goods which have been purchased by the agent so as to create
feasible travel packages while maximizing the utility of the
agent’s clients. The …nal score achieved by every agent is
calculated as:
Score = Sum(CU)¡(Cost)¡(OverSellPenalty) (5)
Cost = Sum(Purchases)¡ Sum(EntertT icketSales) (6)
OverSellPenalty = Count(TicketsOverSold) ¤ 200 (7)
TicketsOversold represents the number of entertainment
tickets that the agent sold exceeding the available quantity
that it originally had or bought. A more detailed description
of the game can be found in [1].
3. CHALLENGES
There are several challenging issues in designing and im-
plementing a successful bidding strategy for the TAC mar-
ket scenario. Given the current ticket holdings (if any), the
current market prices (or maybe the estimated prices) and
the client preferences the agent is required to …nd the most
pro…table combination of tickets that need to be traded in
order to complete travel packages. The completion problem
[6] is a hard one since the number of the available tickets is
constrained by the availability in the market. An additional
problem arises since accurate price estimation is very di¢-
cult, if not impossible, because of the limited information
the game provides, that is the current asking prices. The
agent knows nothing about the other agents’ bids or ticket
demand while the game is running. Standard machine learn-
ing techniques are very hard to apply since the agent cannot
observe the bidding patterns of the other participants.
Having already decided what tickets and how many are
needed, the problem is to decide when and how much to
bid. The agent may also consider bidding for tickets not
currently included in the optimum package list to maintain
‡exibility later in the game.
The key resources are the hotel reservations since they are
vital for the construction of feasible travel packages. Their
limited availability makes them the most sought-after goods.
Failing to acquire a particular hotel reservation may jeopar-
dize the whole package. Things get even worse when the rest
of the tickets have already been secured. Hotel auctions are
ascending-price ones, and consequently once the price goes
up there is no way back. An obvious strategy would be for
the agent to place its bids at a high price, say $1000. The
agent will most probably win the rooms at a price equal to
or lower than the bid price and would not have to monitor
the hotel auctions to update its bids. If the bid is rejected
then the ask price would be much higher and therefore the
reservation would not be pro…table for the agent. Such a
strategy has the drawback that the initial decision cannot
be changed since bid withdrawal is not allowed.
The limited availability of hotel rooms creates a further
dilemma: since ‡ight prices will most likely increase with
time, the expenses will be minimum if all wanted tickets are
1AA and AD are the actual arrival and departure days re-
spectively.
purchased at the beginning of the game. This means com-
mitting early on packages, and thus having less ‡exibility to
move a client’s trip later in the game. The agent may fail
to reserve some of the hotel rooms needed to assemble the
travel packages, and additional ‡ight tickets may have to be
purchased to allow for changes. This entails that some of
the initially purchased ‡ights will remain unused while the
expenses will increase. On the other hand, ‡ights for each
client could be purchased when all the necessary hotel rooms
have been reserved, but the ‡ight prices may be signi…cantly
higher, again leading to increased expenditure.
Although the entertainment tickets are not as important
as the other resources, the additional bonus that can be
obtained can distinguish a good agent from a not so good
one. These are the only goods that can be both bought and
sold. Sometimes it is more pro…table to sell a ticket than to
assign it to a customer, a fact that adds to the complexity
of the bidding strategy. Last but not least, the agent has to
take into consideration network disruptions and delays and
make sure that its bids arrive on time.
4. THALIS
The design of Thalis2 was based on a multithread, mod-
ular model that ensures both independence and su¢cient
interoperation between the di¤erent modules. The imple-
mentation language was Java. More details on the design
and implementation of Thalis can be found in [8].
4.1 Initial Allocation and Optimization
At the start of the game Thalis performs the initial allo-
cation taking into consideration the ‡ight auctions opening
prices as well as an estimation of the closing prices for ho-
tel auctions that are generated via the use of statistics from
previous games. Based on these two sets of information the
optimizer calculates the cost of all possible solutions and se-
lects the optimum one for every client. In order to avoid
solutions that might result into excessive demand on a spe-
ci…c day and thus in excessive cost, the system applies an
after-optimization process that attempts to reduce the num-
ber of reservations requested on particular nights. This is
called the night reduction scheme.
The system uses an optimization process in order to con-
tinuously evaluate the client preferences against the current
situation in the game and designate the optimum solution.
The optimizer takes into consideration a number of parame-
ters in order to output the optimum solution for every client:
² Client preferences
² Auction data, including status, last ask price levels and
estimated price increase
² Coe¢cients, regarding the utility calculation for the case of
good hotel solution and the penalty applied when selecting
a solution that deviates from the original client preferences.
² Statistical data weight factor
The system makes use of historical data in order to es-
timate the hotel auction closing prices. A weight factor is
used depending on the ‡ow of the games. This closing price
estimation a¤ects only the night reduction scheme (see be-
low) and the initial bid levels, while the remaining price es-
timation is based on the estimated ask price increase. The
number of past games considered is a parameter in the sys-
2Thallis the Militian (643 B.C.-548 BC) Greek Mathemati-
cian.
Figure 1: Flight Auction Prices Distribution.
tem. The already purchased goods including ‡ights and ho-
tel nights for every client are also taken into consideration.
The optimizer creates an array of all possible solutions for
every client (irrelevant of its preferences). Possible solutions
include every valid combination of arrival day, departure
day, type of hotel and …nally an array of all possible combi-
nations of entertainment tickets for the duration of the trip.
The utility value of any possible travel solution is calculated
according to the following equation:
U = 1000¡
(TravelPenalty) + (HotelBonus) ¤HotelBonusCoef (8)
Where HotelBonusCoef is the weight coe¢cient for the
utility calculation in case of a good hotel solution. The
optimizer calculates the cost of every possible solution based
on the estimated ask price (last ask price increased by the
estimated last ask price increase) of the relevant auction if
the item has not been bought yet. After the purchase of the
item, the relevant cost is set to 0. The system designates the
optimum solution for every client as the one that maximizes
the di¤erence of its utility compared to its cost:
SolutionScore = U ¡ StillT oPayCost (9)
Every entertainment package generated for each client has
its own utility which is calculated based on the client prefer-
ences (Equation (4)). Once a solution for a client has been
chosen, bid requests are issued to all the auctions involved
in the solution. The system allocates purchased goods based
on the requests received. Instead of keeping a chronological
order (FCFS - …rst come …rst served), an ordering of the
clients’ pending requests by expected revenue is required in
hotel and entertainment auctions. For entertainment auc-
tion requests, clients are arranged by decreasing fun bonus
preferences so the client that has the highest bonus is al-
located purchased tickets …rst. For hotel auctions, pending
requests are sorted by decreasing good hotel bonus for good
hotel auctions and increasing bonus for bad ones.
4.2 Flight Auctions
Although the server applies a random strategy in calcu-
lating the initial level of ‡ight prices and their subsequent
variation, as it can be clearly seen in Figure 1 prices tend to
generally increase with time (Note that data plotted in this
…gure include all 1040 games of the seeding rounds). Al-
though, a good strategy would involve bidding for ‡ights as
soon as possible after game initialization, this means com-
mitting early on packages and as a consequence having less
‡exibility to move a client’s trip later in the game. In or-
der to tackle this problem, a limit on the number of ‡ights
Figure 2: Flight Auctions Prices Distribution (Only
10 subsequent games considered)
purchased early on in the game was established. The dis-
tribution of ‡ight auction prices was monitored on a small
sample of 10 subsequent games. This was considered appro-
priate since in a large sample, small variations of the price
may be hidden or balanced by the average function. A dis-
tribution based on 10 games is plotted in Figure 2. As it
can be seen there, almost all ‡ight auctions tend to main-
tain their initial price levels until game second 130. Prices
remain relatively low until game second 300. After this the
rates of increase are relatively high. Thalis’ strategy in ‡ight
auctions can be summarised as follows:
² Flight requests generated after the night reduction scheme
activation, are submitted to the auction manager. The ex-
act time of bid submission is then dynamically decided upon
satisfaction of at least one the following conditions:
- Auction price remains unchanged for more than four
subsequent quotes
- Auction price has steadily positive or negative di¤erence
(compared to the opening price) for more than two subse-
quent quotes
- Auction price has increased by more than 5 cost units
or has decreased by more than 10
- Game time exceeds minute …ve
² Flights that refer to client solutions that have either marginal
revenue (i.e. below 90 cost units) or refer to four nights stay
are not treated as above. Instead they are treated by a
heuristic called DenyFlights. This heuristic allows the delay
of the purchase of ‡ights for a couple of clients per game.
Thus, the relevant bid submission is prevented until one of
the following conditions is ful…lled:
- Total increase in the prices of both ‡ight auctions in-
volved (arrival and departure) exceeds time and value limits
stated in Table 1.
- Game time exceeds game minute …ve (5).
4.3 Hotel Auctions
Although the TAC game involves a great deal of uncer-
tainty and unpredictability, the participants’ bids tend to
follow certain patterns and these patterns may stabilise over
time. In Figure 3 average hotel prices have been plotted for
all qualifying games and the …rst 100 seeding round games.
Game sec Value Upper Threshold
(cost units)
140 19
200 29
260 45
Table 1: Deny Flights heuristic time/value limits
Figure 3: Hotel Auction Prices Distribution (ESR:
End of Seeding Rounds, First 100: only the …rst 100
games of the seeding rounds are considered).
It is quite obvious that auctions tend to clear at an almost
predetermined way that only varies slightly with the num-
ber of games. And in any case the relations between the
prices of di¤erent auctions is kept constant. So for instance,
it is clear that in both cases in Figure 3, day 1 good hotel is
cheaper than day 2 good hotel. Even more speci…cally day
1 good hotel represents a price that is approximate to the
50% of the price of day 2 good hotel. The slight change in
price levels that is observed in the ‡ow of games re‡ects the
changes in agents’ strategies and in the client preferences.
The normal distribution of auction prices supports the
use of statistics on clearing prices in order to obtain a rough
estimation of future auction prices. However, instead of us-
ing all games in estimating the hotel prices, in practice we
use only the ten (10) most recent games excluding the last
game played. Thus, only the latest information available
on the bid patterns of the other agents is taken into con-
sideration. The last played game is excluded since i) if the
prices are normally distributed, then it does not make any
di¤erence, and ii) if it involves excessively high prices this
may mean that either some agent(s) changed its strategy
or something unusual had happened. In either case exclud-
ing this last game should not make a huge di¤erence to our
agent’s strategy. On the other hand if a change of strategy
has taken place this will be taken into consideration as the
games progress.
4.3.1 Night Reduction Scheme
As noted above demand for hotel reservations for the mid-
week days 2 and 3 is usually higher than that for days 1 and
4 (Figure 3). This leads to high auction prices for both ho-
tels for those days. To avoid solutions that might result in
excessive demand on a speci…c day and therefore in exces-
sive cost, the system applies an after optimization process
that attempts to reduce the number of hotel reservations
requested on particular nights. This process works together
with the optimizer (more or less like a guided local search
algorithm) and:
² locates the days on which an excessive number of hotel
reservations are requested (based on selected solutions). The
decision is based on parameters stating the maximum pre-
ferred number of reservations per mid-week day (days 2 and
3) and per far-out day (days 1 and 4).
² applies a (parameter supplied) penalty so as to arti…cially
increase the estimated closing price of the speci…c day’s ho-
tel auctions
² re-runs the optimizer so as to recalculate the cost of each
possible solution for every client and select the optimum one
² applies the above process for as long as the conditions ap-
ply or more than 50 repetitions (threshold) on a speci…c day
didn’t result in a change. The termination limit (50 repe-
titions) is necessary because the night reduction algorithm,
in contrast with the optimizer, may not terminate (just like
a local search algorithm).
The night reduction scheme is activated in the form 5-3
(up to 5 reservations on day 1 and 4 and up to 3 reservations
on days 2 and 3).
4.3.2 Bid Timing and Submission
All hotel auctions clear only once: when they close. At
minute four one random hotel auction closes, and one ran-
dom hotel auction closes every minute thereafter. By bid-
ding before minute four the agent does not gain any signif-
icant advantage; on the contrary early bidding reveals the
agent’s intentions and the level of bids. Thus Thalis is-
sues bids for the hotel auctions only after game minute four
and these are issued every minute at a predetermined sec-
ond (parameterHotelBidT ime, default value 35). Although
this means that Thalis misses the …rst auction that closes on
minute 4, the information gained regarding the level of bids
and consequently the other participants’ intentions compen-
sates for this.
4.3.3 DOSEF Heuristic
Since the sequence with which hotel auctions are closing
is not predetermined, unavoidably there will be cases where
bad hotel auctions will close …rst. In these cases bad hotel
auctions usually close at a very low price while in the same
game the same day good hotel auction usually closes at a
much higher price. Due to these facts, all good hotel auction
requests are replicated before the …rst bid to the bad hotel
auctions. These replicated requests are to be used only when
bad hotel auctions close …rst and at a low price. The whole
idea of this heuristic is to keep all alternatives open (with the
lowest risk possible) until after the …rst hotel auction closes
(minute 4). After that the DOSEF (DOuble Shoot EFfort)
heuristic is retracted in the sense that bids for each hotel
auction are placed only for the auction’s original requests.
4.4 Entertainment Auctions
Entertainment tickets are a very good way to increase the
utility by buying tickets and reduce the cost of the agent’s
packages by selling owned tickets that are not very prof-
itable in the clients’ selected solutions. Nevertheless, spe-
cial care has to be taken in order to submit sell and buy
Agent Average nights Avg Score
reduction
BigRed 7,08 572,94
TOMAhack 6,90 2501,12
Cuhk 5,38 2970,59
livingagents 5,08 3012,81
Thalis 4,64 2875,36
UMBCTAC 4,18 2897,73
Zepp 3,80 2050,42
kavayaH 3,43 2265,25
PackaTAC 3,39 2654,19
SouthamptonTAC 3,26 3006,98
Sics 2,53 2548,15
RoxyBot 2,50 2561,50
ATTac 2,21 3018,05
Walverine 1,30 2415,19
Tvad 1,14 2586,67
PainInNEC 1,05 2154,78
whitebear 0,43 2775,19
TniTac 0,07 2279,57
Harami 0,00 2035,73
Table 2: Average night reduction per agent
bids that will actually maximize the revenue of the agent
without necessarily doing the same for the other partici-
pants. Both actions (buying and selling) are initiated after
EntsEarliestBid game second and terminate on the last
second of the game (although, as we will see after the qual-
ifying and seeding rounds this strategy was modi…ed).
5. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
Thalis participated in the …rst stage of the competition
achieving the 10th place among 26 agents in the qualify-
ing rounds and 6th in the seeding rounds. More than 1000
games where played during the seeding rounds and every
agent participated in 440 games. Since most of the agents
participating had already stabilized their performance, it
was deemed necessary to evaluate the strategy that had
been used thus far as well as the results achieved in or-
der to improve the performance of the agent. The logging
module that had already been working with game logs in or-
der to parse and store the …nal auction prices in the system
database, was extended so as to be able to download and
fully parse the game log …les. The system database resulted
in more 1,500,000 records and a size of 250 MBs.
5.1 The night reduction scheme
The main idea here was to evaluate the result of the avail-
able reduction schemes and compare them to select the most
appropriate. A comparative query was constructed in order
to get a picture of all the agents’ relevant performance 2.
Although a direct relation between average number of
nights and average score does not exist, still extreme values
(very low or very high) should be avoided. Agents marked
in italics in Table 2 seem to de…ne two sets of ranges within
which the average nights reduced should be. The possible
reduction schemes are listed below:
² 5-3 schema: MaxNumEdgeDayNights =5 & MaxNumMid-
DayNights=3
² 5-4 schema: MaxNumEdgeDayNights =5 & MaxNumMid-
Figure 4: Nights Reduction Schemes Comparison
Reduction Scheme Average Nights Reduction
5-3 schema 4.64
5-4 schema 2.72
4-4 schema 2.84
G-B 4-3 schema 3.22
Table 3: Average Nights Reduced per reduction
schemes
DayNights=4
² 4-4 schema: MaxNumEdgeDayNights =4 & MaxNumMid-
DayNights=4
² G-B 4-3 schema (Good - bad hotel 4-3): Here the limita-
tion was taken from the day level and applied to the auc-
tion level. So the maximum night restriction applies (for
edge and mid-week days respectively), but not for the total
number of night requests per day. Instead it applies for the
number of night reservation requests per good and bad hotel
auctions separately.
Using the same query, as above, and a simulation run
for all games played by Thalis for every possible reduction
scheme, the results can be seen in Figure 4. Note that the
5-3 scheme tends to achieve a higher degree of reduction in
a large percentage of games (more than 15% of games had
a 5 night reduction). On the other hand the 5-4 and 4-4
schemes tend to keep the majority of games at no reduction
(0 nights reduced), while the G-B 4-3 scheme is somewhere
in between. Based on these results the 4-4 scheme was se-
lected to be used during the semi-…nal and …nal rounds. It
provides a low average of night reduction and thus it will
allow for higher scores (since the utility is going to remain
high) especially if prices are kept at low levels. If the values
of Table 2 are compared to the ones in Table 3, one can see
that the selected scheme provided a value within the lower
range of selected agents which by the way, includes the best
three participants in the seeding rounds.
5.2 DenyFlights Heuristic
This heuristic allows the delay of the purchase of ‡ights
for a couple of clients per game. This is considered in cases
in which the client solutions have marginal revenue (below
90 cost units) or involve a 4-night stay. Since it is not easy
to evaluate how close to that target Thalis was during run-
time, the simulation process was used again to reproduce all
Reduction Scheme Average Nights Reduction
5-3 schema 0.98
5-4 schema 0.725
4-4 schema 0.778
G-B 4-3 schema 0.75
Table 4: DenyFlights average clients for the various
reduction schemes.
Agent Mean Num Of Flights
tvad 16,97
kavayaH 16,68
PackaTAC 16,51
SouthamptonTAC 16,29
whitebear 16,26
sics 16,24
Thalis 16,18
cuhk 16,14
Walverine 16,12
ATTac 16,06
PainInNEC 16,06
BigRed 16,06
tniTac 16,05
UMBCTAC 16,01
livingagents 16,00
harami 16,00
zepp 16,00
RoxyBot 15,82
TOMAhack 15,05
Table 5: Mean number of ‡ights bought per game
the games Thalis had played, under all possible reduction
schemes and monitor the amount of clients that participated
in the DenyFlights heuristic in every game. The results can
be seen in Table 4 for all reduction schemes. It seems that
whatever the reduction scheme the initial target was kept in
average and so no changes were applied in this area.
5.3 Number of ights bought
The data collected from the seeding round games, showed
that there are di¤erences between agents regarding the num-
ber of ‡ights bought per game. Still those di¤erences are not
so high as to require action. The results for all agents can
be seen in descending order in Table 5.
5.4 Entertainment ticket transactions
One important factor in con…guring the range of bids for
both selling and buying entertainment tickets is that the
premium for each such ticket varies between 0 and 199 cost
units. Thus, if sales are to be pro…table we should:
² Sell tickets at a price which is as high as possible, but not
lower than the 50% of the premium.
² Buy tickets at the lowest possible price but never above
the 50% of the premium.
As a consequence, when Thalis acts as a seller, the pro…t
of the buyer agent should not be higher than the pro…t of
Thalis, while when Thalis acts as buyer, the pro…t of the
seller agent should not be higher than the pro…t of Thalis. Of
course this is not always applicable in a real game since the
current prices are not only con…gured by our agent, but the
other agents as well. Still, it seems reasonable to incorporate
Figure 5: Ticket Buy Prices Distribution
Ent Average Total Max Buy Min Buy
type Buy Price Trans. Price Price
1 80,792 12562 189,05 0
2 80,651 12410 189,05 0
3 82,098 12136 200 0
Table 6: Entertainment ticket prices during the
seeding round
these tactics even at a lower level (with the limit being below
the 50% of the premium). Average, min and max buy prices
o¤ered during the seeding round games are listed in Table
6. The average buy price is around 80 cost units for every
kind of ticket which supports our suggestions above.
The distribution of ticket buy/sell prices was plotted in
the graph of Figure 5. As a result the buy and sell price
ranges were con…gured accordingly:
² Buy tickets range: 30-101. The upper limit was extended
above 50% of the premium in order to increase the possibility
that whenever needed, a purchase would take place even at
a slightly higher price.
² Sell tickets range: 81-125. The lower limit was extended
slightly below 50% of the premium in order to increase the
possibility that sell bids would result in a transaction.
Figure 6 represents graphically the price areas for buy
and sell tickets. Since agents are interested in selling tick-
ets in order to decrease their cost, it seems quite normal for
them to get “anxious” as time goes by and tickets are not
Figure 6: Entertainment Ticket Price Range
Time Average Max Buy Min Buy
Range Buy Price Price Price
<6th Min 90,81562 191,8193 17,1777
>=6th Min 73,3162 189,35 0
Table 7: Ticket Sell Price statistics before and after
game minute 6
Figure 7: Day 1 hotel auctions
sold. This “anxiety” is translated in the tendency to sell at
lower prices. After analysing all the seeding round games,
the results proved that agents do tend to sell at lower prices
as time goes by. Speci…cally this tendency is increased af-
ter the 6th game minute as seen in Table 7. As a result,
a modi…cation was implemented in the strategy regarding
entertainment tickets. More speci…cally while selling tickets
is allowed after minute 1, bids for buying tickets are only
issued after game minute 6 so as to minimize the cost of
buying tickets and increase the overall score.
5.5 The high auction prices phenomenon
In many cases during the seeding rounds games, although
a good result was produced by Thalis’ strategy, the …nal
score was quite low. This was as a consequence of auctions
clearing at very high prices. The mean bid prices that agents
o¤er for every di¤erent hotel auction per day have been plot-
ted in Figures 7- 10. As can be observed, Thalis agent was
Figure 8: Day 2 hotel auctions
Figure 9: Day 3 hotel auctions
No Agent Avg Score
1 Whitebear (Cornell University) 3412.78
2 SouthamptonTAC (Southampton Univ.) 3385.46
3 Thalis (Essex University) 3246.27
4 UMBCTAC (UMBC) 3235.56
5 Walverine (University of Michigan) 3209.52
6 Livingagents (Livingagents AG) 3180.89
7 KavayaH (Oracle India Pvt Ltd) 3099.44
8 Cuhk (Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong) 3068.77
Table 8: TAC 2002 Final Results.
one of the few agents o¤ering low prices in good hotel auc-
tions. In bad hotel auctions our prices where a little bit
higher compared to good hotel auctions, but still much lower
than most of the other agents’. Thus the bad hotel price
calculation was lowered so as to o¤er even lower prices in
these auctions, especially in cases that the DOSEF heuristic
was applied. More speci…cally the lowest bid limit for these
auctions came down to 30 cost units from 45-50 that was be-
fore. After studying all games in which the high bid prices
phenomenon occurred it was ascertained that in these cases
most other participants were requesting only one hotel night
and our agent was requesting one or more. After studying
the other agents’ bid strings in all relevant games the prob-
lem was revealed: the tactics applied now did not use High-
Low bids3 (except when applying DOSEF) while some of
the others (the most successful in score) did. Since all other
agents (participating in the same auction) requested only
one night, they could not apply High-Low bids to hold the
prices low. So the solution applied to solve this problem was
to modify the bidding module so as to issue High-Low bids
whenever more than one items are requested. Even further
in cases where Hwon value ensures that items requested are
going to be transacted, the new low price was allowed to
be even lower in order to stop prices from going up. This
aspect of the strategy was named price stopper heuristic.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In total nineteen teams, representing academic institu-
tions, research centers and companies [2] participated in the
competition. After incorporating all the above modi…ca-
3High-Low bid: The bid includes one bundle with high price
and one bundle with low price.
Figure 10: Day 4 hotel auctions
tions, Thalis participated in the semi …nal group 2 games
and was placed third in this group, thus qualifying for the
…nals. The main conclusion from those games was that most
of the successful participants followed the same basic tactic
as Thalis: they lowered the prices in order to achieve high
scores. Those that did not follow this tactic were left out of
the …nals, even if their strategy had been successful during
the course of the seeding rounds (e.g. ATTac). The …nal
round of games were staged in two servers simultaneously
and in total 32 games were played. The results are shown
in Table 8. After successfully participating in the last two
competitions [5] we hope we will be able to participate in
next year’s event whose market scenario is going to change
from a travel market scenario to a supply chain one.
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